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Income Support Policy
Overview—This paper examines the economic profile of
custodial and noncustodial parents and the status of the
federal/state child support enforcement system, which
serves about two-thirds of all families eligible for support.
Issues discussed include the reasons for the historically
low rate of child support collection; the prospects for new
computerized systems to improve the rates of both pater-
nities established and payments collected; ways the
system, which is losing revenue, can sustain funding; and
the extent to which child support payments, even in a
perfect system, can improve the well-being of low-income
families. Speakers at the accompanying Forum session
will expand on these topics, and  two state IV-D program
directors will focus on the challenges of administering the
system and the direction of changes in the program’s
goals and financing structure.
Perhaps no other income support issue touches more
American children than child support. Nearly one-third
(23 million) of all children in the United States have a
parent living outside of their household, and more than
half of all children are expected to spend at least some
time in a single-parent family before becoming adults.1
As surprising as it may seem, however, most children in
single-parent families do not receive any formal child
support; over one third are living in poverty.
In 1975 the federal government entered the child
support arena for one primary reason—to collect from
absent fathers of welfare children at least part of the
government’s costs of supporting them. Between 1955
and 1975, due to rising caseloads, national spending on
welfare programs tripled, and it became clear that
widowhood was no longer the primary reason that
single mothers sought government aid.2 At the time,
child support was the domain of local family courts.
Today the federal government is the largest enforcer of
child support, assisting about-two thirds of all eligible
families. Moreover, as the portion of single-parent
families has grown, government has expanded its reach
to help nonwelfare, low-income families, who now
comprise most of its caseload.
Over the past 25 years, states and the federal govern-
ment have spent a total of about $30 billion in getting
tougher on absent parents—mostly fathers. Immediate
income withholding is now the law, and parents delin-
quent in their payments can experience a variety of
penalties, including losing their drivers’ licenses and
passports, having their assets seized, and being jailed.
These efforts have produced some real progress: more
paternities have been established, more awards set, and
more money collected.
Still, child support enforcement figures are sobering.
In fiscal year (FY) 1999, the child support system was
able to secure collections for only 37 percent of its
caseload.3 About 40 percent of cases lacked a court
order for child support. Of cases with established
orders, 37 percent yielded no payment.4
Why have 25 years of reforms failed to make a larger
impact? Simply, the system has not been able to keep
pace with changing family patterns. Since 1970, while the
portion of children living in single-parent families more
than doubled (from 12 percent to 28 percent), the portion
of children born outside of marriage has soared. Today
nearly 40 percent of all children in single-parent families
are living with never-married mothers.5 Most of these
children do not have legally identified fathers, a prerequi-
site for establishing a child support award. Hence, these
children do not receive support.
From the sea of statistics and trends concerning
child support and the federal/state child support system,
the following story emerges:
First, there is reason for optimism. Even advocates
for the poor believe that the most effective changes to
the system, the creation of more sophisticated computer
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systems to track absent parents, will go a long way
towards increasing collections. But these reforms have
only recently been implemented and their impact is just
now being felt.
Second, in order to “fix” the child support system,
the following shortcomings need to be addressed:
 Absent parents are not paying what they are obli-
gated to pay; an estimated $7 billion in court-or-
dered payments is unpaid.
 Support orders are set too low for middle-income
parents and too high for low-income parents.
 About one-quarter of absent fathers have extremely
low incomes and probably need employment assis-
tance to be expected to make their payments.
 Too few single-parent families have child support
awards established.
Third, absent fathers are becoming more vocal in
criticizing the child support enforcement system. They
complain that the government takes their money but
does not ensure access to their children.
Finally, the federal/state child support enforcement
system is in the midst of changing both its goals and its
financing scheme. The system’s welfare caseload is
declining and, with this trend, the original goal of
collecting child support from fathers of welfare children
and its original funding mechanism of directing these
collected dollars to the government in order to pay for
the system are becoming obsolete. The child support
enforcement system now primarily provides income
support to low-income working families, and states and
the federal government are debating how best to fund it.
The issue of additional funding is likely to call
attention to the uneven performance of the child support
system across the states. States administer their own
programs within the parameters of federal law and with
a majority of federal funding. Their success in establish-
ing orders and enforcing payments is, however, highly
variable.
The above issues are all likely to be more deeply
explored when the welfare reform law comes up for
reauthorization in 2002. While the child support provi-
sions of the law are permanently authorized, the welfare
reauthorization debate will offer an opportunity for
review of all provisions. Among the many questions
that policymakers will need to address during that
debate are the following:
 If every absent parent paid the full amount of child
support owed, how much could the welfare case-
load, as well as the child poverty rate, be reduced?
To what extent would full compliance improve the
living standard of single-parent families?
 What obstacles remain to getting more support
orders established and collecting the full payment
amounts?
 How much income do absent parents have? How
much more are they able to pay in child support?
 What is the best formula for determining a “fair”
child support payment level?
 Which recent policy reforms have been most effec-
tive in improving payment rates?
 Should there be a greater balance between punish-
ment and economic help for low-income parents
who do not pay support or do not pay enough? Does
a system that strives to be so tough on absent par-
ents, especially fathers, create any unintended
consequences for children?
 How can the enforcement system be adequately
funded to continue its progress?
 Is the U.S. Office of Child Support Enforcement
(OCSE) likely to step up efforts to help absent
fathers see their children more often?
 How much are states and the federal government
willing to spend to fund a program that “does the
right thing” by making absent parents support their
children—the majority of whom are not on welfare?
A SYSTEM EVOLVING
The focus of the child support enforcement (CSE)
program has changed over the years. Established as an
entitlement program in 1975 (Title IV-D of the Social
Security Act), the CSE system originally had one major
client—welfare families—and one major goal: getting
absent fathers to pay back the government for the costs
of supporting their children. States were given money
to track down and collect child support owed by absent
parents of welfare children. States and the federal
government would keep all of the money collected,
which, until 1989, more than covered the costs of
administering the program. In the early 1970s, the child
support system was actually marketed to state govern-
ments as a moneymaker.
The 1975 law, which established the OCSE, also
gave states the authority to serve nonwelfare families,
but very little financial incentive to do so, since states
would have to pass on any collections to families. This
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provision was included to appease the growing voice of
the women’s movement, which was bringing attention
to the child support woes of middle-income women.
Still, in 1979, only 15 percent of the IV-D caseload was
made up of nonwelfare families.
Since then, the system’s major client and, subse-
quently, its overarching goal have changed. Since 1970,
while the portion of children living in single-parent
families more than doubled (from 12 percent to 28
percent) the portion of children born outside of marriage
more than tripled (from 10 percent to 33 percent).6 As the
number of single-parent families skyrocketed, Congress
put more money behind meeting the system’s second goal
of collecting payments for nonwelfare families.
Today, families using the IV-D system are still
predominantly low-income, although most (78 percent)
are not on welfare.7 However, a large portion (41
percent) of the current caseload has used welfare in the
past; 37 percent have never been on welfare.8 In 1995,
77 percent of IV-D families had incomes below 250
percent of poverty, or about $31,500 that year for a
parent with two children.9
The direction of child support policy seems to be in
step with the rest of welfare policy. Cash aid has
become a time-limited, more minor source of support,
and focus is shifting to the ability of programs such as
the Earned Income Tax Credit, a higher minimum
wage, and child care subsidies to keep low-income
working families afloat. Unfortunately, the child
support enforcement system’s means of financing has
not kept pace with its changing caseload.
SINGLE MOTHERS
The terms “single parenthood” and “single mother-
hood” are practically interchangeable. In 1998, about 14
million parents were raising children (under age 21)
apart from their children’s other parent: about 12
million, or 85 percent, of these custodial parents were
mothers. Thirty-two percent of these mothers were
never married, 31 percent were divorced, 17 percent
were remarried, 13 percent were separated, 5 percent
were legally married but not living with their spouse,
and 2 percent were widowed.10
Most single mothers have modest to low incomes. In
1998, nearly 40 percent were living below the poverty
line ($13,133 for a parent with two children).11 In 1993,
28 percent were estimated to have incomes between 100
percent and 199 percent of poverty, and only 35 percent
were believed to be living above 200 percent of poverty.12
The financial well-being of single mothers varies
greatly by marital status. Previously married mothers
fare much better than those who never married moms.
Never-married mothers are almost twice as likely to be
poor than divorced mothers (51 percent, compared with
28 percent in 1998).13 Never-married mothers are less
educated, have lower personal earnings, and are far less
likely to receive child support than previously married
mothers. In 1996, 42 percent of previously married
mothers received child support, compared with 18
percent of never-married mothers.14 Only one-third of
the children of never-married mothers are estimated to
have a legally identified father.
Single Mothers in the IV-D System
In 1995, nearly 8 million custodial mothers were
served by the IV-D system.15 These mothers were
significantly more disadvantaged than single mothers
not using the system. For instance, in 1995 most IV-D
families had incomes between $0 and $20,000, while
only 25 percent of non–IV-D families fell into that same
income range. Among all custodial parents of IV-D
families, 34 percent had never been married, while only
13 percent of non–IV-D parents had never been mar-
ried. Of all families headed by a never married parent,
82 percent were participating in the IV-D program.16
ABSENT FATHERS
Nearly 11 million fathers in the United States do not
live with their children. Two-thirds of them pay no formal
child support.17 Three questions are frequently raised in
the discussion over whether, and to what extent, these
fathers should be pushed to pay more. Can they afford to
pay more, or anything at all? Are these fathers fit to spend
time with their children, as the payment of support may
increase the contact a father has with his children? Does
a father’s paying child support to his noncustodial chil-
dren diminish the standard of living of any children
currently living with him?18
A lack of data makes it difficult to fully understand
absent fathers’ circumstances. National surveys tend to
over-represent previously married fathers and fail to
capture a large portion of never-married fathers, who
are more likely to be poor and more likely to be the
fathers of poor children. It is estimated that about one-
third of all absent fathers are missing from the National
Survey of Households and Families, considered one of
the best sources for child support data.19 Researchers
have, however, been able to piece together some
information about their circumstances.
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Ability to Pay
The income of nonresident fathers ranges widely.
About 20 percent have incomes over $40,000, about 40
percent have incomes between $20,000 and $40,000,
and about 40 percent have incomes under $20,000.20 In
total, about 23 percent of absent fathers are believed to
be living in poverty, about half the poverty rate of
single mothers.
Data reveal that more fathers can afford to pay some
child support. Of the 7 million absent fathers who paid
no child support in 1997, about 4.5 million of them had
incomes above the poverty line.21
Major differences also exist between previously
married and never-married fathers. Slightly over half of
absent fathers were not married when their children were
born. Previously married fathers are more likely to pay
child support and far less likely to have their nonresident
children living in poverty. Previously married fathers are
older and healthier, have more schooling, and reportedly
earn about twice as much as never-married fathers
(between $30,000 and $40,000 for the former versus the
mid- to high teens for the latter).22
However, official data probably underestimate the
earnings of never-married fathers. Recent research
suggests that about one-quarter of these fathers earn
extra money “under the table.” For those who do, the
added income raises their estimated earnings by more
than 25 percent.23
Comparative Living Standard
Children with absent fathers are up to 70 percent
more likely to be poor than their fathers.24 By compari-
son, while absent fathers have lower incomes than do
resident fathers, their living standards are about the
same as resident dads. This is because absent fathers are
not likely to be supporting their own, or someone else’s,
children. Less than one-third of absent fathers are living
with a new partner and children. Of the fathers who are
living with new families, research suggests that paying
child support does not shift the incidence of poverty
from the old family to the new.25
Fit Parents?
Fathers who pay child support are more likely to be
involved with their children and to have contact with
the children’s mother. It is not clear, however, whether
the act of paying child support causes more contact or
whether the fathers who see their children more regu-
larly are also those who tend to pay support.26
Questions arise about whether some fathers should
be pursued by the child support system, because the
pressure to pay may trigger conflict, and possibly
violence, towards children and their mothers. In fact,
the federal child support system does not punish welfare
mothers who refuse to cooperate with child support
authorities for fear of violence. Research reveals very
little about this concern. Researcher Irwin Garfinkel
and colleagues note that, while a number of recent
studies have reported high rates of domestic violence
among welfare mothers, with rates ranging from 15
percent to 32 percent, these studies do not distinguish
between nonresident fathers and other partners.27
Many of the recent studies profiling nonresident
fathers focus on young, black, inner-city men. In
summarizing these studies, Garfinkel and colleagues
note, “While many young fathers have trouble holding
a job and may even spend time in jail, most have
something to offer their children. The overwhelming
impression of these young men conveyed by the litera-
ture is one of immaturity and irresponsibility rather than
pathology or dangerousness.”28 In addition, the studies
found that most mothers would like these fathers to be
more involved with their children.
Still, in 1997 about 15 percent of custodial parents
without support awards said they did not want the
absent parent pursued because they preferred no con-
tact.29 There is a special concern about low-income
fathers who may be angered by having to make pay-
ments they believe are too high or that they cannot
afford. A group of studies in Colorado found that nearly
one-quarter of welfare applicants reported current
domestic abuse; three-quarters of them reported that the
abuser was the father of their children.30
CUSTODIAL FATHERS, ABSENT
MOTHERS
In 1998, about two million, or 15 percent, of all
custodial parents were fathers, a rate that had remained
unchanged since 1994.31 Custodial fathers do finan-
cially better than custodial mothers; mothers have
almost triple the poverty rate of fathers (11 percent
versus 32 percent). By comparison, custodial fathers are
less likely to be never-married (18 percent versus 31
percent) and substantially more likely to be working full
time (77 percent versus 47 percent).32
At the same time, when compared with single moth-
ers, custodial fathers are much less likely to be awarded
child support and, when awarded, are less likely to receive
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any payments from their children’s mother. About 38
percent of custodial fathers are awarded support, com-
pared with 60 percent of custodial mothers. Of those
fathers awarded support, 36 percent receive no money,
compared with 28 percent of custodial mothers.33
Custodial Fathers in the IV-D System
In 1995, the IV-D program served nearly one
million, or almost half, of all custodial fathers.34 Fathers
headed 11 percent of all IV-D families that year.
Custodial fathers were better off than custodial mothers;
50 percent of IV-D families headed by men were
receiving no public assistance, compared to 34 percent
of female-headed IV-D families.
INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS
There is a big caveat to the officially dim picture of
child support collections in the United States. In 1997,
more than half (56 percent) of all custodial parents said
they received some type of informal support for their
children from absent parents. The support came in a
variety of forms, including holiday gifts, clothing,
groceries, medical expenses, child care, and summer
camp fees.35 Absent parents with child support orders
were more likely to provide such help than were those
without orders (63.2 percent versus 47.5 percent).36
About one-fifth of fathers not paying formal child
support are believed to be making informal payments.37
Some mothers prefer to keep child support arrange-
ments informal. In 1997, about one-third of the 6.6
million custodial parents without child support awards
reported that they did not feel the need to go to court
and make it legal.38 These mothers are frequently
unmarried, young, and still emotionally attached to the
fathers of their children. They often say that setting a
formal award is a betrayal of the absent father, a vote of
no confidence, and they believe the father’s bonds to
his children and to the children’s mother would be
stronger if the system were not involved.39
Studies reveal, however, that over time, noncustodial
fathers become more distant from their children. Most
unmarried fathers, for instance, are emotionally at-
tached to their families when their children are born,
although they may not be living with them. By the time
the children are school age, most of the fathers are no
longer attached.40 Without a formal award, support is
likely to dwindle, or stop all together.
Advocates note that informal giving works against
absent fathers if awards are legally established. The
government does not recognize any informal contribu-
tions as payments, and any arrearages owed would be
just as high as if the father never contributed anything.
This can be especially harmful to low-income fathers.
FATHERS’ PERSPECTIVE
Fathers have become especially vocal in criticizing
the child support enforcement system. Their major
concerns are that, while they are required to meet
monthly support payments, mothers are not required to
adhere to visitation agreements. When child support
enforcement was largely a private matter, fathers often
used child support payments to leverage access to their
children. The child support system enforces collection
but does not enforce any visitation arrangements that
have been developed.
In addition, analysts note that the system is dispro-
portionately hard on lower-income fathers. Studies find
that, overall, low-income fathers pay a higher portion of
their income in child support (28 percent versus 10
percent, according to one study.)41 That is because
many states calculate payments according what the
father can earn (at a full-time, minimum wage job) or
according to the costs of raising a child, as opposed to
the father’s actual earnings.
Finally, low-income fathers find it particularly
difficult to pay arrearages, which are frequently called
for when delinquent fathers are tracked down. In setting
child support payments for fathers of welfare children,
the IV-D program allows states to include Medicaid
birthing costs and welfare payments made to the family
before the support order was established.42 Some
researchers suggest a more lenient policy be adopted so
that low-income fathers can pay an amount more in line
with their incomes.
POVERTY AND CHILD SUPPORT
Families who receive child support are less likely to
be poor than those that do not. In 1997, only 15 percent
of single parents who received all support due were
poor; the rate was 29 percent for those receiving partial
payments and 36 percent for those receiving no pay-
ments.43 This relationship, however, is not entirely
causal.
Researchers caution that even a flawless child support
system would not eliminate welfare or most of child
poverty. They find that poor single women tend to have
children with poor single men. A sizeable portion of
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absent fathers—about 20 percent—are believed to have
incomes below $6,000. When looking just at nonpaying
fathers, about 30 percent to 40 percent are believed to
have incomes below this amount.44 The earning power of
both parents is low to begin with, and because they live
apart from each other, they do not benefit from consoli-
dated living expenses.45 For this reason, many now
believe that public policy should pay more attention to
raising the incomes of poor fathers in order to make a
bigger impact on lowering child poverty rates.
Current child support payments have a modest impact
on relieving child poverty. In 1997, child support pay-
ments lifted 3 percent of nonwelfare families served by
OCSE out of poverty and reduced the number of welfare
families by 356,000, or 10 percent of the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) population.46
Still, child support is a significant income source for
families—especially poor families—who receive it. In
1996, children receiving child support received about
16 percent of their income from this source (about
$3,795). For poor children who got it, child support
constituted more than one-quarter of their family
income (about $1,795).
FEDERAL REFORM ACTIONS
Today the public child support enforcement system
serves about two-thirds all families eligible for child
support and handles about 85 percent of all payments to
children. The rest are handled by private attorneys,
collection agencies, and locally funded enforcement
agencies and through parental agreements.
The system reaps $4 for every $1 it spends in
collection. In 1998, states and the federal government
spent $3.6 billion and collected nearly $16 billion. Two-
thirds of the system spending is federal.47
The child support reforms of the past 25 years,
which have come in spurts, include the following major
events:

1975—The federal government establishes Title IV-
D of the Social Security Act and the federal OCSE
and requires that each state establish its own office.
Federal funds pay for 75 percent of state enforce-
ment costs. Mothers on AFDC are required to
cooperate with their state IV-D office in order to
receive welfare, and any child support collected for
them goes to the state. States are also allowed to
assist nonwelfare single parents, but this group
comprises only about 15 percent of states’ cases.48

1984—Under the Child Support Enforcement
amendments to P.L. 98-378, Congress calls on states
to develop guidelines for determining child support
payment levels, but courts are allowed to ignore
these guidelines. Income withholding is required for
absent parents who are one month late in paying.
States are also required to take certain measures to
improve their rates of establishing paternity. As an
incentive for welfare mothers to pursue child sup-
port, Congress requires states to allow welfare
mothers to keep the first $50 of the absent father’s
payment. Also, to increase collections, procedures
are developed to garnish the tax refunds of delin-
quent noncustodial parents who are not on welfare.

1988—As part of the Family Support Act, Congress
requires states to enact immediate wage withholding
for all welfare cases by 1990 and for all nonwelfare
cases by 1994. Payment level guidelines issued in
1984 are to be binding on judges. Also, child sup-
port takes policy some steps toward helping absent
fathers, rather than only punishing them. Two pots
of money are available for states to experiment with
helping poor and unemployed absent fathers get
work and with getting them access to their children.
States are also required to implement automated
statewide tracking and monitoring system by Octo-
ber 1995 or face federal penalties.

1993—Congress requires all states to establish in-
hospital paternity programs, which allow
noncustodial fathers to acknowledge paternity
voluntarily.
 1996—As part of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),
OCSE is called to create a national directory of newly
hired employees. States must require all employers to
report new hires within 20 days to the state child
support agency. These actions are projected to reduce
the delay in wage withholding from six months to one
month. States must also create centralized collection
units designed to send families payments only two
days after the state collects them from fathers’ em-
ployers. While states are required to give a higher
portion of arrears collected to former welfare families,
they are excused from the mandate to pass along the
first $50 of monthly child support to welfare families.
Since 1996, 32 states have decided to revoke the $50
pass-through rule. In addition, states are required to
have laws for suspending drivers’, professional,
occupational, and recreational licenses of parents





Of the 21 million children who are eligible for child
support, about 3 million lack health care coverage.49
Since 1984, Congress has enacted three major reforms
to improve health coverage for children with child
support orders. In 1984, it required states to include
medical support in any child support order whenever
health care coverage is available to the noncustodial
parent and at “reasonable cost.” The term “reasonable
cost” varies among the states.
In 1985, the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (DHHS) issued rules requiring state child
support agencies to provide information on absent par-
ents’ health care coverage to the state Medicaid agency to
ensure that Medicaid was not covering any children
whose absent parents could offer them private coverage.
And, in 1993, Congress moved to correct obstacles to
private coverage posed by the employers of absent
parents. Until then, it was common for employers to
extend dependent coverage to children only if they were
living with the employee. The 1993 law prohibited
employers and insurers of noncustodial parents from
denying health care coverage to children on the grounds
that they did not live with the covered employee, were
born out of wedlock, or were not claimed as a dependent
on the employee’s income tax return.50
These provisions appear to be making a difference.
In 1997, 61 percent of support orders established
included health insurance, up from 46 percent in 1991.
However, only 39 percent of orders enforced included
dependent coverage, only two percentage points higher
than in 1991.51 Progress has also been made in shifting
more Medicaid-eligible children into private coverage
offered through their absent parents. Between 1989 and
1998, the portion of Medicaid-eligible children whose
absent parents could have offered them private cover-
age decreased from 48 percent to 30 percent.
Congress is considering more reforms in this area. In
1998, it established the Medical Child Support Working
Group, jointly sponsored by DHHS and the Department
of Labor. The group recently developed 76 recommen-
dations for making technical improvements to the
current system and for thinking about new ways that the
child support system can increase health coverage for
children with support orders. Some of the recommenda-
tions include (a) requiring state agencies, in cases
where each parent has health insurance, to decide which
coverage is better and (b) suggesting that outreach
workers be stationed in child support agencies to enroll
children eligible for Medicaid and the State Children’s
Health Insurance Program (SCHIP).52
IMPACT OF REFORMS
National child support enforcement rates have been
stagnant for decades and only recently have begun to
improve markedly. However, the tremendous increase
in the numbers of never-married mothers has helped to
depress these rates and is masking the achievements of
the IV-D program.
The federal/state child support enforcement program
has made progress on several fronts. Total collections,
parents located, paternities formalized, and awards
established are all up by over 250 percent since 1978.53
Interestingly, the greatest progress in collections has
been for never-married mothers, whose rates of receiv-
ing child support increased almost four-fold between
1976 and 1997—from 5 percent to 18 percent. Progress
for previously married mothers was much more
modest—from 36 percent to 42 percent during that
same time.
Program improvements have particularly escalated
since 1996, as states stepped up their implementation of
the computerized tracking and collection systems
required by Congress. By the end of FY 1998, 41 states
had set up the immediate wage withholding systems
required by the Family Support Act of 1988.54 Before
the 1988 law, only two states had this in place.55
In addition, by August 2000, 38 states had fully
implemented the centralized collection and disburse-
ment systems required by the 1996 welfare reform
law.56 These systems are designed to send families
payments only two days after the state collects them
from the absent parents’ employers. Also in FY 1998,
the number of states connected to the central computer
system that handles interstate requests rose from 13 to
33.57 Interstate cases have been the most difficult to
collect on and comprise one-third of all CSE cases.
Data suggest that this automation has paid off. From
1995 to 2000, IV-D program collections have increased
from $11 billion to $18 billion; the portion of cases with
support orders has increased from 57 percent to 61
percent, and the collection rate for cases with orders has
doubled, from 34 percent to 68 percent.58 Researchers
and advocates believe that the national registry of new
hires mandated in 1996 will continue to improve child
support rates. Since the directory’s creation, 2.8 million
parents delinquent on their child support payments have
been identified.59
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Another effective measure from the 1996 law
appears to be the effort to seize the assets of parents
delinquent in child support payments. The law estab-
lished a system to match delinquent parents with
financial institutions. To date, more than 4,200 financial
institutions are participating. By early 2001, nearly
700,000 parents had been matched with their accounts,
which were valued at nearly $2.5 billion.60
VARIATIONS IN STATE
PERFORMANCE
States vary widely in the amount of money they
spend on each CSE case and in their success in estab-
lishing orders and collecting support. For example, in
1998 New Mexico collected $1.59 for every $1.00 it
spent on administration, while Pennsylvania collected
over $7.00.61 As for success rates, between FY 1998
and FY 1999, 16 states increased their number of
support orders by more than 10 percent; 5 of these
states increased their number by more than 50 percent.
During that same time, however, 22 states saw a 10
percent drop in their number of orders established; in 7
of these states, the drop was more than 50 percent.62
Evidence suggests that higher state spending on en-
forcement yields better results.63 For instance, five states
that spend the lowest on each case collect on only 14 per-
cent of the cases they investigate; this rate increases to 34
percent for the five states that spend the most per case.64
IV-D PROGRAM AND WELFARE
FAMILIES
Over the years, the IV-D program has built a convo-
luted array of rules for determining how much child
support can be kept by current and former welfare
families, groups that together comprise over 60 percent
of all IV-D families. These rules pull in opposite
directions and reflect lawmakers’ conflicting desires to
use the IV-D system to recoup welfare expenditures and
to allow welfare families to get the emotional and
financial benefit of receiving absent parents’ support
payments. Before the 1996 welfare reform law, welfare
families were required to sign over to the state all
arrearages that accrued before and during the family’s
welfare stay. Under the 1996 law, families leaving
welfare are now allowed to keep any arrearages that
accrued before they went on welfare, with several
complicated exceptions. The most important caveat is
that any child support payments recouped from federal
tax refunds are kept by the state.
At the same time, the 1996 law repealed the mandate
to allow welfare families to keep the first $50 of their
monthly child support award. The law was enacted in
1984 to encourage welfare mothers to establish pater-
nity; states and the federal government split the loss of
passing on the $50 monthly payment to welfare fami-
lies. Under current law, states have the option to pass
along the money but must bear all of the costs of doing
so. As mentioned earlier, 32 states have now opted to
keep the $50, so that none of an absent parent’s pay-
ment goes directly to the family.65
There is growing political support for allowing current
and former welfare families to keep more of their child
support payments. Research suggests that fathers are
more willing to pay support if they know it will go
directly to their children. And, philosophically, many
lawmakers believe that, because cash aid is now a time-
limited benefit, low-income families should receive child
support so that they can more quickly move off of welfare
and increase their chances of staying off. Bills have been
introduced in the House and the Senate that would
encourage states to reinstate the pass-through and allow
former welfare families to keep more of their arrearages.
SYSTEM FINANCING
The federal government has always supported state
CSE systems generously. It covers two-thirds of the
states’ costs of running their programs and allows them
to keep at least half of the payments collected from
fathers of welfare children. Because of this financial
arrangement, the program has always been a money-
loser for the federal government and a “cash cow” for
states, which are allowed to spend their profits, with
some exceptions, on whatever they choose.66 (States
reinvest about two-thirds of their collections in social
service programs for the poor).67
Now, due to a declining welfare caseload, states are
less ahead, and federal program outlays far outweigh
total state savings. Today, $3.6 billion in total program
spending is able to generate only about $2 billion in
welfare revenues; the CSE program now costs taxpay-
ers over $1 billion a year. Still, CSE systems in 25
states generate more money than they spend.
The changing CSE caseload has forced a reexamina-
tion of how best to fund the system. A short-term issue
is how to compensate for declining welfare revenues.
Cost recovery is no longer a viable means by which to
finance the system and, philosophically, there is grow-
ing support for allowing welfare families to keep more
of their child support payments. While states would lose
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money from such a policy change, many of them
support passing collections on to families because it
would greatly simplify program administration.
A longer-term issue is whether states and the federal
government should renegotiate how much each should
contribute to sustain the child support system. Altering
the federal/state match rate has been discussed in the past
but is not being talked about now. Some in Congress
believe the state contribution should be higher, given that,
overall, the program is still a money-maker for states,
while federal program costs have increased dramatically.
It should come as no surprise that states oppose
contributing a higher match, pointing to the myriad
federal regulations they have had to implement over the
years, as well as the increasing complexity of running
the system. State savings, they hold, are not “profits”
but partial reimbursement for the cost of supporting
welfare families over the years. They also emphasize
that most of the savings are poured back into the human
service system.68 In addition, some note that a lower
federal match could hurt the program’s popularity with
state legislators, who might be less willing to direct
program savings back into human services.
An even longer-term issue is how much states and
the federal government are willing to contribute to an
entitlement program that is serving not only more
families, but also many more families who are not an
immediate burden to the government. Financing the
child support system has become akin to financing a
police force. Voters support ensuring public safety, but
how much safety is it willing to pay for? In 1999, the
$3.6 billion CSE system reaped payments for just 37
percent of its caseload. Making significant improve-
ments will probably cost more, even with advances in
automation. States and the federal government may or
may not be willing to help many nonwelfare families
receive the support owed them.
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACHES
Congress is paying more attention to helping low-
income absent fathers increase their earnings to better
support their children. Few government welfare or job
training programs specifically target this group. The last
wave of welfare reform placed strict work requirements
on parents—mostly mothers—who received welfare,
and states were also called on to help them with job
training and job search. Absent parents, most of whom
are fathers, do not qualify for cash aid and are generally
not encouraged to participate in TANF job support
programs. Their access to Food Stamps is time-limited,
they have narrow access to Medicaid, and, if working,
are eligible for only a small refund from the Earned
Income Tax Credit.69
In 1997, federal rules that prevented child support
system dollars from being spent on job services were
eased, and more states are now experimenting with
helping absent fathers raise their income. Parents’ Fair
Share, a seven-state pilot program established by the 1988
Family Support Act, was an earlier demonstration with
this design. The program, which ran from 1992 to 1996,
was designed to improve both the level of child support
payments and the employability of absent fathers with
children on welfare. The program was successful in
increasing support payments, but its impact on improving
the work picture for these fathers is less clear.
Meanwhile, Wisconsin is exploring the impact of
allowing welfare families to keep all child support paid
by absent parents. As part of its W-2 welfare reform
program (initiated before the enactment of the
PRWORA in 1996), the child support provisions are
designed to encourage mothers to establish paternity
and fathers’ to pay support, because the payment goes
directly to the children. (Vermont, Connecticut, and
Georgia are all conducting similar programs, but Wis-
consin’s is the only one to count all child support
payments as income when determining cash aid eligibil-
ity.) A recent program evaluation, conducted by the
Institute for Research on Poverty, found that W-2
increased the likelihood that fathers would pay support
and establish paternity and that the pass-through mea-
sure did not increase net government costs.70
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
Bills have been introduced in both the House and the
Senate that would have the dual effect of passing along
more child support collections to welfare families and
reducing welfare collections as a funding source for the
CSE system. The bills also include fatherhood initiatives.
Distribution Reform
In the House, Reps. Nancy Johnson (R-Conn.) and
Benjamin Cardin (D-Md.) have reintroduced a bill that
last session passed the House but died in the Senate. In
the Senate, three bills have been jointly and separately
introduced by a number of child support reform advo-
cates, principally Sens. Evan Bayh (D-Ind.), Herb Kohl
(D-Wis.) and Olympia J. Snowe (R-Me.).
These House and Senate bills would make very
similar changes to child support distribution policy.
11 
1. Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of
Representatives, “2000 Green Book: Background Material
and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the
Committee on Ways and Means,” Committee Print 106-14,
October 6, 2000.
2. Irwin Garfinkel, Daniel R. Meyer, and Sara S.
McLanahan, “A Brief History of Child Support Policies in the
United States,” Working Paper #98-29, Center for Research
on Child Well-Being, University of Wisconsin, March 20,
1998.
3. Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), “Child
Support Enforcement FY 1999 Preliminary Data Report,”
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, September,
2000; accessed June 27, 2001, at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/
programs/cse/prgrpt.htm.
4. Office of Child Support Enforcement (OCSE), “Child
Support Enforcement, 23rd Annual Report to Congress,” U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, October 2000;
accessed June 1, 2001, at http://www.acf.dhhs.gov/programs/
cse/rpt/annrpt23/index.html.
5. Ways and Means, “Green Book.”
Basically, all bills would reduce or eliminate the
exceptions that allowed states to keep child support
arrearages that accrued to families before they went on
welfare. All bills would also excuse states from repay-
ing the federal share of revenues lost from allowing
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The policy allowing families to keep more child
support is supported by both Democrats and Republi-
cans but was not a financial priority in the administra-
tion’s budget proposal. Now, because the Senate is back
in Democratic hands and because Tommy Thompson,
the new DHHS secretary, implemented this policy
statewide when he was governor of Wisconsin, many
believe legislation will pass that would encourage states
to do the same. Thompson also endorsed direct child
support payments to current and former welfare families
in testimony before the Senate in April.
Fatherhood Initiatives
The House bill and one of the Senate bills include
funding for fatherhood programs that would promote
marriage, make fathers more employable, and encour-
age more interaction between fathers and children. The
House bill would provide $140 million in grants to
public and private groups over four years. The Senate
bill would authorize $300 million in grants to states
over five years. President Bush included a similar
fatherhood initiative in his 2002 budget proposal, and
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DIRECTIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Child support can be a significant source of income
for single-parent low-income families and is likely to
become more significant now that cash aid is time-
limited. The CSE system now handles more cases than
the private system and, many argue, is in a position to
improve both payment levels and collection rates. Prog-
ress is being made, thanks to stronger government efforts
and more sophisticated computer systems, and research
indicates there is room for much more. Yet, at a time
when the system is being asked to be a high performer, it
appears to be underfinanced. Congress and the states will
need to decide how far they are willing to go to help
nonwelfare families receive the support that is owed them.
THE FORUM SESSION
Elaine Sorensen will begin the meeting with an
overview of the profile of both custodial and
noncustodial parents involved with the child support
system and the relationship between poverty and a
family’s access to child support. Sorensen is a labor
economist and principal research associate at the Urban
Institute, where she specializes in the issues of child
support and low-income noncustodial fathers. Vicki
Turetsky, senior staff attorney with the Center for Law
and Social Policy, will provide background on the
current financing structure of the IV-D program and on
issues related to funding stability.
Two state IV-D program directors will comment on
the above presentations and offer their perspectives on
the challenges of administering the system as well as
the direction of changes in the program’s goals and
financing structure. Nathaniel L. Young, Jr., is
director of Virginia’s Child Support Enforcement
System. He also heads the national association that
represents state IV-D program directors. Theresa
Kaiser is executive director of the Maryland Child
Support Enforcement program, which has a special
focus on assisting low-income noncustodial fathers to
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